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CHAPTER 5 
Evidence 
SURVEY stafft 
§ 5.1. Expert Testimony in Legal Malpractice Actions.* Expert testi-
mony is generally appropriate when the introduced evidence is beyond 
the common knowledge and experience of the average lay juror1 and will 
assist the jury in determining a fact in issue. 2 Massachusetts courts have 
held expert testimony necessary in legal malpractice actions to establish 
the standard of care owed by the attorney and the attorney's alleged 
departure from such a standard.3 In some cases, courts have held that 
lack of expert testimony on the determination of attorney negligence may 
justify a directed verdict in favor of the attorney. 4 However, the long 
standing exception to the rule has been that expert testimony is not 
essential in those cases where the attorney's breached duty is so clear 
or obvious that negligence may be inferred by the lay juror based on 
common knowled~e and experience.5 With respect to malpractice actions 
where the aggrieved client alleges that attorney negligence resulted in an 
unreasonable out-of-court settlement, Massachusetts, like many jurisdic-
tions, has had no governing rule regarding the admissibility of expert 
testimony relating to the reasonableness of the settlement value. During 
the Survey year, however, the Supreme Judicial Court considered this 
very issue in Fishman v. Brooks, holding that expert testimony is admis-
~ t Eric I. Lee, Kate H. Lind, Ieuan Mahony, Valerie L. Passman, David L. Ruediger. 
*Eric I. Lee, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 5.1. 1 C. McCoRMICK, McCoRMICK oN EviDENCE§ 13 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984); FED. 
R. Evm. 702. 
2 FED. R. Evm. 702. 
3 The necessity of expert testimony in such actions was explicitly established in Glidden 
v. Terranova, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 597, 598, 427 N .E.2d 1169, 1170 (1981). Other cases have 
adopted the Glidden rule. See, e.g., Fall River Sav. Bank v. Callahan, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 
76, 82, 463 N.E.2d 555, 560, further appellate review denied, 392 Mass. 1103, 465 N.E.2d 
262 (1984); Brown v. Gerstein, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 558, 566, 460 N.E.2d 1043, 1049,/urther 
appellate review denied, 391 Mass. 1105, 464 N.E.2d 73 (1984); DiPiero v. Goodman, 14 
Mass. App. Ct. 929, 929-30, 436 N.E.2d 998, 999 (rescript opinion), further appellate 
review denied, 387 Mass. 1102,440 N.E.2d 1177 (1982), appeal dismissed, 460 U.S. 1029-
30 (1983). 
4 See, e.g., Pongonis v. Saab, 396 Ml,l.ss. 1005, 486 N.E.2d 28 (1985); DiPiero, 14 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 930, 436 N.E.2d at 999-1000. 
5 See, e.g., Pongonis, 396 Mass. at 1005, 486 N.E.2d at 29; Varnum v. Martin, 32 Mass . 
. (15 Pick.) 440, 442 (1834) (per curiam). 
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sible for determining the reasonable value of a settlement.6 Hence, the 
Supreme Judicial Court announced for the first time that in legal mal-
practice actions, expert testimony addressing the reasonableness of a 
settlement may be admitted as evidence of an attorney's alleged negli-
gence. 
In the original action that gave rise to Fishman v. Brooks, the plaintiff, 
Brooks, suffered personal injuries when a motor vehicle traveling in the 
same direction struck him as he rode his bicycle in the breakdown lane 
of a highway.7 Brooks retained Fishman to represent him in the personal 
injury action. 8 Fishman practiced mainly in real estate conveyancing and 
was inexperienced in personal injury cases.9 The manner in which Fish-
man pursued his client's tort claim was questionable. Fishman did not 
commence suit until sixteen months after the accident, did not obtain 
service on the driver of the motor vehicle for more than ten months after 
filing the complaint, made no effort to examine the motor vehicle or to 
investigate what the driver had been doing immediately prior to the 
accident, sought no useful pretrial discovery, relied only on information 
the driver's insurer volunteered, and informed Brooks that the available 
insurance coverage was $250,000, when in fact it was $1,000,000. 10 At 
one point, Fishman told Brooks that he could not win if he went to trial. 11 
Shortly before the scheduled trial, Brooks agreed to settle his claim 
for $160,000, knowing that Fishman was not prepared to try the case. 12 
Brooks subsequently sued Fishman for malpractice, 13 alleging that Fish-
man's negligent representation in the personal injury action obliged him 
to settle the personal injury action for an amount substantially less than 
a reasonable settlement value. 14 At trial, the Superior Court for Middlesex 
County allowed, over Fishman's objections, expert testimony by an ex-
perienced personal injury attorney and a claims adjuster as to the rea-
sonable settlement value of Brooks' personal injury action against the 
6 396 Mass. 643, 647-48, 487 N.E.2d 1377, 1380 (1986). 
7 Id. at 644, 487 N.E.2d at 1378-79. 
• Id. at 644, 487 N.E.2d at 1379. 
9 Id. at 645, 487 N.E.2d at 1379. Fishman had not tried a case of any sort since 1961, 
fourteen years before taking Brooks' case. Id. 
10 ld. In April 1978, a federal district court judge assigned the case for trial on the docket. 
Fishman then consulted an able attorney experienced in personal injury litigation about 
referring the case to him, but the negotiations failed because Fishman refused to agree to 
an even division of his contingency fee. Id. 
II Id. 
12 ld. 
13 ld. at 644, 487 N.E.2d at 1378. Brooks entered his malpractice claim as a counterclaim 
in an action initially brought by Fishman, alleging that Brooks violated terms of their 
agreement requiring Brooks to pay Fishman any amount Brooks saved in negotiating 
settlement of medical bills. Fishman eventually abandoned his claim. Id. 
14 ld. 
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motor vehicle driver. 15 The attorney testified that such a case typically 
would settle for $450,000 to $500,000. 16 The claims adjuster estimated a 
settlement range from $400,000 to $450,000. 17 The jury returned a verdict 
for Brooks and awarded damages. 18 Fishman appealed, challenging the 
admissibility of the expert testimony. 19 
On its own motion,' the Supreme Judicial Court transferred the case 
from the appellate court and ordered direct review. 20 Affirming the trial 
court's judgment, the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the admissibility of 
the testimony of the two expert witnesses relating to the reasonable value 
of the action in establishing attorney negligence. 21 The Court reiterated 
the general principle that an attorney who does not hold himself out as 
a specialist owes his client a duty to exercise the degree of care and skill 
of the average qualified practitioner, 22 and that one who violates this duty 
is liable to his client for any reasonably foreseeable loss caused by his 
negligence.23 The Court then stated that a plaintiff in a legal malpractice 
action will prevail if he proves that he probably would have obtained a 
better result had the attorney exercised adequate skill and care. 24 
Recognizing the general admissibility of expert testimony to determine 
attorney negligence,25 the Court held that testimony by the experienced 
attorney and the claims adjuster was admissible to prove not only Fish-
man's negligence but also that his negligence caused a loss to Brooks.26 
The Court stated that the expert testimony relating to a fair settlement 
was relevant to the question of the reasonableness of the settlement, and 
15 /d. at 647-48, 487 N.E.2d at 1380. The trial judge also allowed the expert testimony 
of a law school professor concerning the ethical obligations of attorneys. /d. at 649, 487 
N.E.2d at 1381. 
16 /d. at 648, 487 N.E.2d at 1380. 
17 /d. 
18 /d. at 645-46, 487 N.E.2d at 1379. The jury found that Fishman was negligent in his 
handling of the personal injury action and that Brooks was damaged thereby in the amount 
of $525,000. /d. at 645, 487 N.E.2d at 1379. The driver's negligence was 90% and Brooks' 
negligence was 10% of the contributing cause of his injuries. /d. The jury also awarded an 
amount of $10,000 on Brooks' abuse of process claim. /d. at 645-46, 487 N.E.2d at 1379. 
The judge entered judgment on the malpractice count by reducing Brooks' damages to 
reflect his contributory fault, the amount of medical expenses paid from the settlement, 
and the amount Brooks received personally from the settlement. /d. at 646, 487 N .E.2d at 
1379. No reduction was allowed for Fishman's counsel fees collected in the original action. 
/d. 
19 /d. at 644, 487 N .E.2d at 1378. 
20 /d. 
21 /d. at 647-48, 487 N.E.2d at 1380. 
22 /d. at 646, 487 N.E.2d at 1379. 
23Jd. 
24 /d. at 647, 487 N.E.2d at 1380. 
25 /d. (citing Pongonis, 3% Mass. at 1005, 486 N.E.2d at 28-29). 
26 /d. at 648, 487 N.E.2d at 1380. 
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was not an attempt to assess the proper measure of damages in the 
personal injury action.27 The Court rejected Fishman's argument that 
such evidence would impose malpractice liability by allowing the jury to 
second guess the attorney's judgment.28 The Court e}~borated that no 
liability would have been imposed for a settlement made within the range 
of the settlement value that an attorney exercising due care would have 
recommended. 29 Hence, the Court definitively declared that ifthe amount 
settled for did not equal or exceed the amount that a non-negligent 
attorney would have recommended for settlement, the case should not 
have been settled. 30 
Fishman represents a noteworthy expansion and elaboration on the 
use of expert testimony in legal malpractice actions. Expert witnesses 
are essential in cases like Fishman, because the jury determination of 
whether the attorney was negligent in advising a certain settlement 
amount entails presentation of evidence that is beyond the common 
knowledge and experience of the average layperson. 31 In reaching this 
result, however, the Court made only cursory mention of the potentially 
adverse impact the decision may have in legal malpractice litigation. The 
Fishman decision may encourage virtually every client, unsatisfied with 
the settlement which his attorney advised, to bring a subsequent legal 
malpractice claim against the attorney, provided that the client can find 
an expert witness (most likely an attorney with a different opinion) who 
is willing to testify that the amount of the actual settlement does not fall 
within what the expert witness believes to be an acceptable range. 32 An 
27 Id. at 648, 487 N.E.2d at 1380-81. 
28 Id. at 648, 487 N.E.2d at 1381. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 649, 487 N.E.2d at 1381. The Court dealt summarily with the issue of the 
admissibility of the testimony from a Jaw school professor concerning the ethical obHg_ations 
of attorneys in general and of Fishman in particular. ld. Because Fishman withdrew his 
relevance objections and failed to renew them, the matter was not reviewed. /d. The Court, 
however, discussed in dicta, the issue of the relationship between the canons of ethics and 
an attorney's duty of care to his cHent. Id. The Court explained that although an ethical 
violation is not an actionable breach of duty to a client per se, if an aggrieved client could 
show that a disciplinary rule was intende<J to protect one in his position, a violation of that 
rule may be relevant and admissible as evidence of an attorney's negligence. /d. The Court 
stated that expert testimony would not be appropriate in the determination of an ethical 
violation, because a competent judge can instruct the trier of fact concerning the require-
ments of ethical _rules. /d. at 650, 487 N .E.2d at 1381-82. The Court, however, noted that 
an expert on the duty of care of an attorney properly could base his opinion on an attorney's 
failure to conform to a disciplinary rule. Id. at 650, 487 N.E.2d at 1382. 
31 See Barry, Legal Malpractice Actions in Massachusetts, 63 MAss. L. REV. 15, 17 
(1978). 
32 The Court discussed the possibility that an attorney properly informed of all the 
relevant Jaw and facts may still cause a client to settle a case for an amoljnt below that 
which "competent counsel'' would approve. Fishman, 396 Mass. at 646, 487 N.E.2d at 
4
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expert witness in such a case approaches the underlying action after the 
fact, with the benefit of hindsight, and unaware of the complexities unique 
to the individual case. Ideally, the witness giving expert testimony in 
such a (;ase is an experienced practitioner who takes into account all the 
factors of the underlying case; practically, however, such a witness's 
testimony may have the effect of second guessing the defendant attor-
ney's duties. Furthermore, there may be a tendency for the jury to 
overestimate such expert testimony which may increase the possibility 
of unwarranted malpractice liability. 
The defendant attorney, however, can minimize the potentially adverse 
effects of the Fishman opinion by presenting expert testimony on his 
own behalf. Testimony by the defendant attorney's expert witnesses may 
contradict that given by the aggrieved client's witnesses. Where evidence 
presented by different expert witnesses is in dispute, concerns of the 
jury's overestimation of expert testimony and the possibility of imposing 
malpractice liability as a result of second guessing could be alleviated. 
In consideration of these factors, admitting expert testimony relating to 
the reasonableness of the settlement value seems proper. The decision 
seems especially justified in Fishman, where it was the attorney who first 
raised the issue of the fairness of the settlement. 33 As Brooks properly 
argued, where the attorney defends his actions based on the fairness of 
the original settlement, the client must have a fair opportunity to deny 
its fairness in the only reasonable manner possible, that is, with his own 
experts. 34 
The Fishman decision warns members of the bar of the Commonwealth 
that their advice given on claim settlements may be scrutinized by fellow 
members of the legal community. Although an attorney may believe that 
he bas exercised proper professional judgment, he may face malpractice 
liability if the amount of the settlement does not fall within the range of 
a reasonable value of settlement established by another member of the 
1380. The Court, however, noted tbat such a situation is more theoretical than real. "The 
typical case of malpractice liability for an inadequate settlement involves an attorney who, 
having failed to prepare his case properly or lacking the ability to handle the case through 
trial (or both), causes his client to accept a settlement not reasonable in the circumstances." 
/d. The Court stated that a malpractice action would not prevail if the purportedly unrea-
sonable settlement falls within an acceptable "range" of values. ld. at 648, 487 N.E.2d at 
1381. However, this approach assumes concrete boundaries in projected settlement values. 
33 Appellee's Brief at 37, Fishman v. Brooks, 396 Mass. 643, 487 N.E.2d 1377 (No. 84-
1163) (1986) [hereinafter Brief]. 
34 Brief, supra note 33, at 39-40. Fishman's own testimony on the reasonableness of the 
settlement was itself expert testimony. The attorney testified that he consulted with other 
experienced trial attorneys for their opinions, researched in a variety of publications for 
recent comparable verdicts and settlements, factored in inflation, and factored in medical 
facts of the case. Id. at 37-38. 
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bar. 35 Viewed from another perspective, the Fishman ruling effects a self-
policing device by the bar. In Fishman specifically, the testimony of an 
experienced attorney acted as a critical element in imposing malpractice 
liability on a clearly inexperienced and incompetent counsel. By admit-
ting expert testimony in legal malpractice actions, the courts encourage 
more adept legal representation by attorneys in the Commonwealth. 
In summary, the Supreme Judicial Court in Fishman v. Brooks consid-
ered the issue of propriety of expert testimony in a legal malpractice 
action where the client alleged that his attorney's negligence caused him 
to accept an unreasonable settlement. Recognizing the rule that expert 
testimony is generally necessary to establish attorney negligence, the 
Court upheld the use of expert testimony concerning the reasonableness 
of the settlement. 36 Hence, the Court extended the use of expert testi-
mony in legal malpractice actions to a broader domain, admitting such 
testimony as evidence of an attorney's negligent performance of his 
duties. 
§ 5.2. The Independent Relevance Exception to the Rule Against Admis-
sibility of Prior Misconduct Evidence.* Under Massachusetts common 
law, and consistent with most jurisdictions' as well as with the Federal 
Rules of Evidence,2 evidence of prior misconduct by a defendant is not 
admissible to show the bad character of the defendant or to show an 
increased likelihood that the defendant committed the offense charged in 
a specific case.3 In a criminal case, therefore, the prosecution may not 
introduce evidence that a defendant has committed previous crimes to 
show that the defendant had a propensity to commit crime and thus to 
35 Attorneys, like physicians, may be hesitant to testify against one of their colleagues in 
a malpractice action, but they may be less reluctant to present damaging testimony in cases 
like Fishman, where the attorney's performance of his duties was far below the desired 
practicing standard. See supra note 10 and accompanying text for a discussion of attorney 
Fishman's handling of the case. 
36 Fishman, 396 Mass. at 647-48, 487 N .E.2d at 1380. 
*Kate H. Lind, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 5.2. 1 See WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 58.2 (1983) [hereinafter WIGMORE). 
2 FED. R. EviD. 404(b). Rule 404(b) provides: 
/d. 
OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or ab-
sence of mistake or accident. 
3 Commonwealth v. Trapp, 396 Mass. 202, 206, 485 N.E.2d 162, 165 (1985). See P.J. 
LIACOS, HANDBOOK OF MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE 420 (5th ed. 1981 & Supp. 1985) 
[hereinafter LIAcos]; Hughes, Evidence-Law and Practice, 19 Mass. Practice Series 
§§ 303, 306 (1961) [hereinafter Hughes]. 
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create an inference that the defendant is guilty of the specific crime 
charged.4 Regardless of whether evidence of such prior bad acts may be 
probative of whether the defendant committed the crime charged, courts 
routinely exclude such evidence to avoid the risk of unfair prejudice 
against the defendant. Admission ohuch evidence may force the defen-
dant to defend against charges not contained in the indictment, may divert 
the jury's attention from the crime charged in the case, and may waste 
time on collateral issues. 5 Accordingly, Massachusetts courts generally 
exclude such evidence because the risks involved in admitting character 
evidence outweigh its probative value.6 
Nevertheless, Massachusetts courts, consistent with Federal Rule of 
Evidence 404(b), have created an independent relevance exception to the 
general rule of exclusion of character evidence.7 Under this exception, 
character evidence may be admissible when it is relevant to an issue in 
the case other than the defendant's propensity to commit crime, such as 
the existence of a plan or scheme, motive, knowledge, state of mind, 
identity, or existence of a particular skill. 8 For example, in a prosecution 
for first degree murder, evidence that a defendant made two previous 
attempts on the victim's life was admissible despite the fact that it showed 
the defendant's propensity to commit crime because it was relevant to 
the issue of premeditation and indicated the defendant's malice and hos-
tility towards the victim.9 Because the evidence had independent rele-
vance, it fell outside the general rule of exclusion. 10 
Even where evidence of prior misconduct by the defendant has inde-
pendent relevance, the trial judge must still determine whether the pro-
bative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. 11 In Mas-
sachusetts, a trial judge's determination that the probative value 
outweighs the prejudicial effect will be upheld on review unless there is 
"palpable error. "12 In fact, some commentators have noted an increasing 
4 LIACOS, supra note 3, at 420. 
5 Trapp, 3% Mass. at 206, 485 N.E.2d at 165; Hughes, supra note 3, at§ 301. 
6 Hughes, supra note 3, at§ 306. 
7 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 385 Mass. 244, 269,431 N.E.2d 880,895 (1982). 
See generally LtAcos, supra note 3, at 418. Massachusetts courts have also fashioned other 
exceptions including the use of character evidence to impeach the credibility of a witness, 
id. at 146-58, and the introduction by the defendant of evidence of his or her own good 
character where relevant to show that the defendant is not likely to have committed the 
crime charged. /d. at 4ll-12. See also FED. R. Evm. 404(b) advisory committee note. 
8 LIACOS, supra note 3, at 421; Hughes, supra note 3, at§ 306. 
9 Commonwealth v. Bryant, 390 Mass. 729, 744, 459 N.E.2d 792, 802 (1984). 
10 See id. 
11 See FED. R. Evm. 404(b) advisory committee note; LIACOS, supra note 3, at 410. 
12 Commonwealth v. Young, 382 Mass. 448, 462-63, 416 N.E.2d 944, 953 (1981). See also 
Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 385 Mass. 244, 269-70, 431 N.E.2d 880, 896 (1982) (after 
7
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tendency on the part of Massachusetts appellate courts to uphold admis-
sion of prior misconduct evidence without balancing the probative value 
against the risk of unfair prejudice when the evidence fits within one of 
the recognized independent relevance exceptions. 13 
During the Survey year, in Commonwealth v. Jordan (No.1), 14 the 
Supreme Judicial Court reaffirmed the principles underlying the indepen-
dent relevance exception to the general rule of exclusion of prior mis-
conduct evidence. In Jordan, the Court upheld the admission of prior 
misconduct evidence in a prosecution for assault and battery with intent 
to murder. 15 The Court found that the evidence of prior misconduct by 
the defendant was not introduced for the purpose of showing the defen-
dant's propensity to commit the crime charged but was properly admitted 
for its independent relevance in showing the defendant's state of mind 
and intent at the time he committed the crime charged. 16 
Robert Jordan was indicted for armed assault with intent to murder, 
assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon and kidnapping. 17 
The jury convicted the defendant of assault and battery by means of a 
dangerous weapon and kidnapping. 18 At trial, the evidence showed that, 
on November 2, 1982, the defendant beat the victim, with whom he was 
living at the time. 19 The victim testified that the defendant wrapped duct 
tape around her head and mouth, bound her hands and legs, beat and 
kicked her, pounded her face on the floor, and threatened to murder her 
and her father. 20 When she urinated on the floor, the defendant wiped 
weighing probative value against prejudicial effect, Court found the trial judge did not 
"abuse his discretion" in admitting prior misconduct evidence). 
13 LIAcos, supra note 3, at 190 (Supp.); Hughes, supra note 3, at§ 306. But see Com-
monwealth v. Brown, 389 Mass. 382, 385-86, 450 N.E.2d 172, 175 (1983) (trial court's 
admission of defendant's confession relating to robberies for which he was not charged 
held to constitute error because the "incremental value of the references to other robberies 
was minimal and did not outweigh the undue prejudice"). Because the risk of unfair jury 
prejudice against the defendant is so great \l{ith evidence of prior criminal acts, one com-
mentator has ~ecommended that such evidence be admitted only after careful balancing 
and after a ''clear and convincing" showing that the evidence is both necessary and pro-
bative. Hughes, supra note 3, at § 306. 
14 397 Mass. 489, 492 N.E.2d 349 (1986). 
15 Jordan, 387 Mass. at 491-92, 492 N.E.2d at 350-51 (citing G.L. c. 265, § 18 (1984)). 
16 See id. at 492, 492 N.E.2d at 351. 
17 /d. at 489, 491-92, 492 N.E.2d at 349, 350 (citing G.L. c. 265, §§ 15A, 18, 26 (1984)). 
The dangerous weapon used in this crime was the shod foot. Record at 141, Jordan (No. 
84-677) (available at Boston College Law School Library). In Massachusetts, the shod foot 
is considered a dangerous weapon when it is used to kick someone. Nolan, Criminal Law, 
32 Mass. Practice Series§ 325 (1976). 
18 Jordan, 387 Mass. at 489, 492 N.E.2d Jt 349. See G.L. c. 265, §§ 15A, 26 (1984). 
19 Jordan, 387. Mass. at 490, 492 N.E.2d at 349. 
20 /d. 
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the floor and taped the urine-soaked rag into the victim's mouth. 21 After 
twelve hours, the defendant released the victim and her father took her 
to the hospital. 22 
During the trial, the victim testified that the defendant had beaten her 
several times during the nine or ten months that they had lived together. 23 
After his conviction for assault and battery by means of a dangerous 
weapo:p. and kidnapping, the defendant appealed, alleging that the trial 
judge erred in admitting this evidence of prior beatings. 24 The Supreme 
JQdicial Court transferred the case on its own motion and affirmed the 
trial court's decision. 25 
The defendant argued on appeal that admission of the evidence re-
garding his prior beatings of the victim constituted reversible error. 26 The 
defendant claimed that the evidence of his prior bad acts was not admis-
sible to show that he had a bad character or that he had the propensity 
to commit the crime at issue in the caseY Furthermore, the defendant 
21 /d. 
22 /d. at 490-91, 492 N.E.2d at 349-50. The victim's father, accompanied by police, came 
to find the victim after her sister called to tell him that the dog had been left in the yard 
and that no one had answered when she knocked at the door. /d. a,t 490 n.2, 492 N.E.2d 
at 350 n.2. As the sister was driving away, the defendant drove after her and threatened to 
have her arrested if she went back to the house. !d. When she was taken to the hospital, 
the victim's head had to be sheared because the duct tape was stuck to her hair. ld. at 491, 
492 N.E.2d at 350. 
The victim subsequently went back to living with the defendant, but left after he hit her 
over the head with a thirty-pound ceramic tiger, warning her not to testify against him. /d. 
23 /d. Although some of these beatings had required medical attention, the victim testified 
that she had not informed the police or doctors of the defendant's actions. /d. 
24 Id. at 489-90, 492 N.E.2d at 349. The defendant also argued that it was prejudicial 
error for the trial judge to admit evidence suggesting that the defendant had assaulted the 
victim's dog. /d. at 492-93, 492 N.E.2d at 351. The defendant claimed that the evidence of 
his treatment of the dog was not relevant to any mens rea against the victim, and that the 
evidence's "inherently inflammatory character necessarily outweigh[ed] any probative 
value." /d. at 493, 492 N.E.2d at 351. 
The Court found that, because the defendant had not raised this objection at trial, it was 
not properly preserved for appeal, and, therefore, the Court only reviewed the record to 
determine if there was a "substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice." /d. at 493 n.5, 492 
N.E.2d at 351 n.5 (citing Commonwealth v. McGahee, 393 Mass. 743, 749, 473 N.E.2d 
1077, 1082 (1985)). The Court determined that no such miscarriage of justice had occurred. 
/d. at 493, 492 N.E.2d at 351. The Court additionally found that the jury could infer that 
the defendant's mistreatment of the victim's dog was a demonstration of his hostility 
towards the victim herself. /d. Although the trial judge had excused two jurors who said 
they could not remain impartial after hearing the evidence regarding the dog, the Court 
found that this evidence was no more inflammatory than the description of the beating of 
the victim herself, and, therefore, that there was no "substantial likelihood of a miscarriage 
of justice." /d. at 493 & n.6, 492 N.E.2d at 351 & n.6. 
25 /d. at 490, 492 N.E.2d at 349. 
26 /d. at 491, 492 N.E.2d at 350. 
27 /d. (citing Commonwealth v. Trapp, 396 Mass. 202, 206, 485 N.E.2d 162, 165 (1985)). 
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argued, the evidence of prior beatings did not fit within any of the 
exceptions to the rule against character evidence and it was highly prej-
udicial to the defendant because it increased the jury's sympathy for the 
victim, who was the main prosecution witness.28 
Although the Court recognized the general rule of exclusion of prior 
misconduct evidence,29 it found that the prior beatings evidence was 
properly admitted in this case. 30 The Court noted that, in a prosecution 
for assault with intent to murder, the Commonwealth must prove both 
malice and a specific intent to murder the victim by the assault. 31 The 
Court here found that the evidence of prior beatings was probative of 
the defendant's mental state and intent at the time of the crime charged 
because it showed the defendant's malice and hostility towards the vic-
tim.J2 Therefore, the Court found, it was relevant to an "essential ele-
ment" of the crime of armed assault with intent to murder. 33 
The Court held that the admissibility of the prior beatings evidence 
was unaffected by the fact that the jury found the defendant guilty of 
assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon and not of armed 
assault with intent to murder. 34 In determining the relevance of the evi-
28 Brief for Defendant at 9-10, Jordan (No. 84-677) (available at Boston College Law 
School Library). 
29 Jordan, 397 Mass. at 491, 492 N.E.2d at 350. 
30 /d. at 492, 492 N.E.2d at 351. 
31 /d. at 492, 492 N.E.2d at 350 (citing Commonwealth v. Burkett, 396 Mass. 509, 512, 
487 N.E.2d 478,480 (1986) and Commonwealth v. Henson, 394 Mass. 584, 591,476 N.E.2d 
947, 952 (1985)). In Henson, the Court clarified that proof of "intent to murder" requires a 
showing of both malice and a specific intent to kill. Henson, 394 Mass. at 591,476 N.E.2d 
at 952. The Court there explained that while murder may be committed without a specific 
intent to kill, the offense of assault with intent to murder does require a specific intent to 
kill. /d. at 591 n.4, 476 N.E.2d at 953 n.4 (quoting PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 763 (2d ed. 
1969)). 
32 Jordan, 397 Mass. at 492, 492 N.E.2d at 351 (citing Commonwealth v. Bryant, 390 
Mass. 729, 744, 459 N.E.2d 792, 802 (1984)). In Bryant, a first degree murder case, the 
Court affirmed the trial judge's admission of evidence that the defendant had made two 
previous attempts on the victim's life within a two month period. 390 Mass. at 744, 459 
N.E.2d at 802. The Court reasoned that the evidence was admissible on the issue of 
premeditation, which is an essential element of first degree murder, and that it tended to 
demonstrate the defendant's hostility towards the victim. /d. Thus, the Court found the 
evidence admissible because, even though it showed the commission of other crimes, it 
was relevant to prove an element of the crime charged in this case. /d. 
33 Jordan, 397 Mass. at 492, 492 N.E.2d at 351 (citing Commonwealth v. Little, 376 
Mass. 233, 238, 379 N.E.2d 1105, 1108-09 (1978)). In Little, the Court found no error in a 
trial judge's admission of evidence that the defendant had previously "pistol-whipped" a 
man as a lesson to the victim in the case being tried. 376 Mass. at 238, 379 N.E.2d at 1108-
09. The Court found that the trial judge had admitted the evidence because it showed the 
defendant's hostility or state of mind towards the victim, even though the prior beating 
had occurred two years earlier. /d. 
34 Jordan, 397 Mass. at 492 n.4, 492 N.E.2d at 350 n.4. 
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dence, the Court looked to the crime charged. 35 Because the defendant 
was charged with armed assault with intent to murder, the Court found 
it was proper for the Commonwealth to introduce evidence tending to 
establish malice and the specific intent to murder. 36 
The Court dismissed the defendant's argument that the prior beatings 
occurred at a time too remote to be relevant because they occurred five 
to seven months before the time of the crime charged. 37 The Court found 
that the question of remoteness was "within the sound discretion of the 
trial judge," and that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in this 
case.38 
The Court in Jordan approved the Massachusetts courts' practice of 
admitting evidence of prior criminal acts when such evidence is relevant 
to a purpose other than the defendant's propensity to commit crime.39 In 
Jordan, the Court applied the practice in the context of a prosecution 
for assault and battery with intent to murder, finding that because the 
evidence of prior beatings was relevant to elements of the prosecution's 
case- intent and malice- such evidence was admissible.40 Jordan thus 
demonstrates that when prior misconduct evidence is offered to show 
some relevant fact other than the defendant's general bad character, and 
the trial judge's decision to admit the evidence is not clearly wrong, 
appellate courts in Massachusetts are not likely to find the admission 
erroneous.41 The lack of discussion in Jordan of whether the independent 
relevance of the contested evidence gave it sufficient probative value to 
outweigh its prejudicial effect creates the risk that trial courts will skip 
this necessary balancing process once they determine that character 
evidence fits within one of the recognized independent relevance excep-
tions. 
For the same reasons that the common law rule generally excludes 
prior misconduct evidence, the admission of such evidence, even when 
it fits within one of the recognized exceptions to the rule, may be unfairly 
prejudicial to a defendant. The danger of admitting prior criminal mis-
conduct evidence is that it might lead the jury to infer that the defendant 
had a greater propensity to commit the crime charged - an inference 
which the rule generally excluding character evidence recognizes is im-
35 See id. at 491-92, 492 N.E.2d at 350. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 492, 492 N.E.2d at 351. 
38 Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Baldassini, 357 Mass. 670, 679, 260 N.E.2d 150, 156 
(1970)). 
39 See id. at 492, 492 N.E.2d at 351. See also LIACOS, supra note 3, at 190 (Supp.). 
40 Jordan, 397 Mass. at 492, 492 N.E.2d at 351. 
41 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Young, 382 Mass. 448, 462, 416 N.E.2d 944, 953 (1981). 
See also LIACOS, supra note 3, at 190 (Supp.). 
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permissible.42 Alternatively, the jury might use the evidence of prior bad 
acts to justify conviction of the defendant whether or not guilt is proved 
in the specific case.43 The danger of the jury using prior misconduct 
evidence in one of these impermissible ways exists even though the prior 
misconduct evidence fits into one of the independent relevance excep-
tions to the general rule of exclusion. 44 
Because the risk of unf~ir prejudice is so great, even when the prior 
misconduct evidence is relevant to an issue other than the defendant's 
propensity to engage in criminal activity, the trial judge should carefully 
balance the probative value of and the prosecution's need for the evi-
dence against its prejudicial effect on the jury and its tendency to waste 
time on collateral issues. 45 Such balancing in individual instances would 
decrease the danger of unfair jury prejudice against the defendant. 46 
Despite the rule that the trial court should balance the probative value 
against the risk of undue prejudice for prior misconduct evidence, how-
ever, the tendency of trial courts is simply to admit the evidence if it fits 
one of the recognized exceptions to the rule of exclusionY 
In Jordan, the Supreme Judicial Court appears to affirm a trend in the 
Massachusetts appellate courts to uphold admission of prior misconduct 
evidence so long as it can be "pigeonholed" into one of the independent 
relevance exceptions, without reviewing the trial court's balancing of the 
competing interests involved in the specific case. 48 The Court in Jordan 
held that evidence of the defendant's previous beatings of the victim was 
properly admitted as relevant to the independent purpose of establishing 
the malice element of an assault with intent to murder charge.49 The 
Court, however, simply affirmed the trial court's judgment without ref-
erence to the trial court's weighing of potential prejudicial impact on the 
jury of the prior beatings evidence or the importance of the evidence to 
the prosecution's case.50 The lack of discussion of this important balanc-
ing process even for character evidence that fits within the independent 
42 See FED. R. Evm. 404(a) & advisory committee's note. 
43 See WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 58.2. Indeed, evidence of prior misconduct has been 
called the "prosecutor's delight" because of its potential to affect the outcome of a trial. 
E. Imwinkelried, The Plan Theory for Admitting Evidence of the Defendant's Uncharged 
Crimes: A Microcosm of the Flaws in the Uncharged Misconduct Doctrine, 50 Mo. L. 
REV. 1, 2 (1985). 
44 See FED. R. Evm. 404(b) advisory committee's note. 
45 McCoRMICK, EviDENCE § 190 (3d ed. 1984); Hughes, supra note 3, at§ 306. 
46 See Hughes, supra note 3, at § 306. 
47 Id. . 
411 See Jordan, 397 Mass. at 492, 492 N.E.2d at 351. See also Hughes, supra note 3, at 
§ 306; LIACOS, supra note 3, at 190 (Supp.). 
49 Jordan, 397 Mass at 492, 492 N.E.2d at 351. 
50 See id. 
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relevance exception creates the risk that trial courts will follow the lead 
and admit independently relevant prior misconduct evidence regardless 
of its probative value or prejudicial effect. 
In Jordan, the Supreme Judicial Court reaffirmed the general rule of 
exclusion of prior misconduct evidence and the exception to that rule 
when the evidence has relevance to an element of the crime charged. 51 
The Court held that in a prosecution for assault with intent to murder, 
evidence that the defendant had beaten the victim on previous occasions 
was properly admitted as relevant to the intent and state of mind elements 
of the prosecution's case.52 The Court, however, did not discuss the trial 
judge's weighing of the probative value of the evidence as compared to 
its prejudicial effect. The Court's decision thus suggests that it will not 
examine the potential for unfair prejudice of prior misconduct evidence 
once it is established that this damaging evidence fits within one of the 
independent relevance exceptions to the general rule of excluding char-
acter evidence. 
§ 5.3. Social Worker Privilege.* Massachusetts courts have interpreted 
the social worker privilege contained in chapter 112, section 1351 broadly 
to prevent disclosure at trial of communications to a social worker 
whether the social worker acquired the communication from consulting 
with a specific client or with a third party. 2 Although the statute limits 
the scope of the privilege to communications from a person "consulting" 
with the social worker,3 the Supreme Judicial Court has indicated that, 
as long as the informant "appears to be a person who consulted" the 
social worker, the communication is within the scope of the social worker 
privilege.4 Therefore, because the Court has upheld the application of 
the privilege to communications from people other than specific clients,5 
and because the Coutt has not strictly construed the statutory require-
ment that the communication arise from a consultation, 6 the social worker 
privilege potentially protects all communications a social worker acquires 
51 See id. at 491, 492, 492 N.E.2d at 350, 351. 
52 Id. at 492, 492 N.E.2d at 351. 
* leuan Mahony, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 5.3. 1 G.L. c. 112, § 135 provides in part: "No social worker ... shall disclose any 
information he may have acquired from a person consulting him in his professional capacity 
or whom he has served in his professional capacity .... " 
2 Commonwealth v. Collett, 387 Mass. 424, 430, 439 N.E.2d 1223, 1227 (1982); Com-
monwealth v. LeCain, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 1034, 1035, 477 N.E.2d 205, 206 (1985). 
3 G.L. c. 112, § 135. 
4 Collett, 387 Mass. at 429, 439 N.E.2d at 1227. 
5 Id. at 430, 439 N.E.2d at 1227. 
6 See id. at 429, 439 N.E.2d at 1227. 
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in his or her professional capacity,7 unless an exception to the privilege 
applies. 8 
Massachusetts is unique in its broad interpretation of the social worker 
privilege. Other state courts construing statutes creating a similar social 
worker privilege have taken a less liberal approach in defining the scope 
of the privilege. 9 These courts, unlike Massachusetts courts, have re-
quired an examination of the actual social worker-informant relationship 
to determine whether the privilege applies. 10 Underlying the approach of 
other state courts is the premise that a broad interpretation of any priv-
ilege conflicts with the general common-law rule that testimonial privi-
leges should not be construed expansively. 11 
During the Survey year, in Allen v. Holyoke Hospita/, 12 the Supreme 
Judicial Court reaffirmed its broad interpretation of the social worker 
privilege, and held that information a social worker acquires from any 
informant is privileged if the social worker acquired the information 
during a consultation. 13 By not requiring a specific finding that a social 
worker acquire the information during a consultation in which the infor-
mant sought advice or assistance, the Court indicated that an informant 
7 ld. at 441, 439 N.E.2d at 1233 (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
8 Communications which are otherwise privileged are subject to disclosure where the 
informant waives the privilege by written consent, G.L. c. 112, § 135(a), or by bringing an 
action against the social worker, G.L. c. 112, § 135(c), where the communication "reveals 
the contemplation or commission of a crime or harmful act," G.L. c. 112, § 135(b), where 
the information is needed in certain child custody proceedings, G.L. c. 112, § 135(d), (e), 
or where a social worker acquires the information while conducting an investigation pur-
suant to chapter 119, section 51B, G.L. c. 112, § 135(f). 
9 People v. Lipsky, 102 Misc. 2d 19,423 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1979) (construing what is currently 
N.Y. Ctv. PRAc. L. & R. § 4508 (McKinney Supp. 1987)); State v. Martin, 274 N.W.2d 
893 (S.D. 1979) (construing what is currently S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.§ 36-26-30 (1986)), 
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 883 (1979). 
1° For example, in State v. Martin, the Supreme Court of South Dakota held that S.D. 
CoDIFIED LAws ANN. § 36-26-30, which limits the privilege to a communication to a social 
worker "in his professional capacity that was necessary to enable him to render services," 
required an examination of the facts and circumstances of each social worker-informant 
relationship. Martin, 274 N.W.2d at 895. The Martin court held that a conversation between 
the defendant and his social worker of six to eight months was not privileged because the 
record did not indicate that the defendant made the statements with the expectation of 
privacy. ld. at 896. Similarly, in In re Koretta W., the New York Family Court construed 
N.Y. Ctv. PRAc. L. & R. § 4508 which limits the privilege to communications from a client, 
to require an examination of the social worker-informant relationship. See In re Koretta 
W., 118 Misc. 2d 660, 661-62, 461 N.Y.S.2d 205, 206-07 (1983). The Koretta court further 
determined that even if a person is a social worker's client, the privilege will not protect 
statements unless they were made with the expectation of privacy. See id. at 662, 461 
N.Y.S.2d at 207. 
11 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 2192 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). 
12 398 Mass. 372, 496 N.E.2d 1368 (1986). 
13 ld. at 377, 378 n.5, 496 N.E.2d at 1371, 1372 n.5. 
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may "consult" with· a social worker for the purposes of establishing a 
privilege merely by giving the social worker information during an inves-
tigation.14 Thus, the Court in Allen found that the privilege protected 
information a social worker acquired from a child's grandparents and 
foster parents during a Department of Social Services investigation, 15 
without requiring a finding that the foster parents or grandparents sought 
the social worker's advice or assistat;Ce during the "consultations."16 
The plaintiff in Allen17 alleged that Holyoke HospitaP8 negligently 
caused the death of her four year old son. 19 In response, the defendants 
claimed that because the decedent had received inadequate care during 
the early years of his life, the plaintiff's negligence contributed to his 
death. 20 To support their claim of contributory negligence, the defendants 
sought evidence regarding the nature of the care the plaintiff provided 
the decedent, and requested all documents in the possession of the De-
partment of Social Services (Department) relating to the removal of the 
decedent from the plaintiff's custody.21 
When the defendants requested the Department's records in discovery, 
the plaintiff claimed that the records were protected by the social worker 
privilege contained in chapter 112, section 135.22 The defendants con-
14 See id. at 377-78, 496 N.E.2d at 1371-72; cf. id. at 386-87, 496 N.E.2d at 1376-77 
(Liacos, J., dissenting). 
15 Id. at 375, 378, 4% N.E.2d at 1370, 1372. 
16 See id. at 378, 496 N.E.2d at 1372. 
17 The Court referred to the decedent's natural mother, Dawn M. Allen, in her individual 
capacity as the plaintiff. Id. at 372 n.2, 4% N.E.2d at 1368 n.2. Ms. Allen also sued in her 
capacity as administratrix of decedent's estate. I d. at 372 & n.1, 496 N .E.2d at 1368 & n.l. 
Ms. Allen's estranged husband also sued in his individual capacity. ld. at 372 n.2, 496 
N.E.2d at 1368 n.2. 
18 The plaintiff also sued, among others, Holyoke Pediatric Associates, id. at 372 n.3, 
4% N.E.2d at 1368 n.3, to whom the decedent's foster mother brought the decedent the 
day before his death. Id. at 373, 496 N.E.2d at 1369. 
19 Jd. at 373, 496 N.E.2d at 1369. The cause of the child's death was septic shock 
secondary to a kidney infection. Id. at 374, 496 N.E.2d at 1369. 
20 Id. at 374, 496 N.E.2d at 1370. 
21 Jd. Approximately one year after his birth, the Department removed the decedent and 
his older brother from the plaintiff's custody for six months. ld. at 374, 4% N.E.2d at 
1371. Approximately eighteen months later, when the decedent was almost three, the 
Department again removed the decedent and his brother from the plaintiff's custody, and 
placed the decedent with foster parents, with whom he lived until his death. Id. The 
defendants sought the records to determine the decedent's health at the time he was 
removed from his mother, his health prior to death, and whether the plaintiff's conduct 
contributed to the decedent's condition or justified reducing the plaintiff's damages. Id. at 
376, 496 N.E.2d at 1371. 
22 Id. at 374,496 N.E.2d at 1370. The plaintiff also claimed that the department's records 
were privileged under the provisions of the Fair Information Practices Act (FIPA), G.L. c. 
66A. Id. 
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tended that the records of the Department were not privileged, and that, 
even if a privilege applied, the plaintiff had waived this privilege by 
bringing her suit.23 The trial judge reviewed the records in camera,Z4 and, 
instead of addressing the privilege issues in the trial court and risking 
reversal on appeal, reported a number of questions concerning the scope 
of the social worker privilege.25 The judge's specific concern was whether 
the privilege protected information acquired by the social worker from 
the decedent's grandparents and foster parents, and the social worker's 
recorded personal observations of the decedent's parents. 26 The Supreme 
Judicial Court transferred the questions on its own motion for review. 27 
The Court first considered the scope of the social worker privilege 
created by chapter 112, section 135,28 and found that except in circum-
stances specified in the statute29 the privilege protects from disclosure all 
information acquired from a person consulting a social worker in his or 
23 Jd. at 376, 496 N.E.2d at 1371. 
24 Jd. at 375, 496 N.E.2d at 1370. The trial judge determined that the records would aid 
the defendants in proving contributory negligence, and that the records might cast light on 
the cause of the decedent's illness. Jd. The Supreme Judicial Court previously endorsed 
the use of an in camera hearing between a judge and a social worker to determine whether 
or not the privilege covets a particular communication. Collett, 387 Mass. at 436, 439 
N.E.2d at I230. The in camera hearing is not to determine whether an informant sought 
the social worker's advice or assistance; rather it is to determine whether a particular 
communication falls within an exception to the privilege enumerated in G. L. c. II2, section 
135(a)-(f). See id. at 438, 439 N.E.2d at I231-32. 
25 Allen, 398 Mass. at 375, 496 N.E.2d at 1370. The trial judge reported the questions 
pursuant to MASS. R. C1v. P. 64, which provides in part: 
/d. 
If the trial court is of opinion that an interlocutory finding or order made by it so 
affects the merits of the controversy that the matter ought to be determined by the 
Appeals Court before any further proceedings in the trial court, it may report such 
matter, and may stay all further proceedings .... 
26 Allen, 398 Mass. at 375, 496 N.E.2d at 1370. The judge reported the questions con-
cerning the scope of the social worker privilege as follows: 
(l) Is a licensed social worker in the employ of the Massachusetts Department of 
Social Services precluded by the provisions of G.L. c. ll2, section 135 from dis-
closing information relative to a child who was the subject of a departmental inves-
tigation which the social worker acquired: (a) from the child's maternal grandparents 
with whom the child did not reside; (b) from the child's foster parents with whom 
the child had been placed by the department; and (c) from the social worker's 
personal observations made within the home of the child's parents in the course of 
the investigation? 
ld. The judge also reported a question concerning whether the department records were 
privileged under FIPA. ld. 
27 Jd. at 373, 496 N.E.2d at 1369. 
28 Jd. at 376, 496 N.E.2d at 1371. 
29 G.L. c. II~, § 135. Section 135 enumerates a number of specific circumstances where 
the social worker privilege will not apply. G.L. c. ll2, § 135 (a)-(f). 
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her professional capacity.30 According to the Court, the privilege indi-
cated a legislative determination that, in order for social work interven-
tion to be successful, communications acquired by a social worker must 
remain confidential. 31 
To determine the meaning of the statutory requirement that the social 
worker obtain the information from a "person consulting" him or her,32 
the Allen Court referred to the Court's 1982 decision of Commonwealth 
v. Collett and to the legislative history of section 135.33 In Collett, the 
Court held that the privilege protects communications a social worker 
acquires from people who technically are not the social worker's clients. 34 
In addition, the Court did not strictly construe the requirement that a 
person consult with a social worker in order to establish a privilege under 
chapter 112, section 135.35 Instead, the Collett Court held that an infor-
mant could claim the privilege as long as the informant "appears to be a 
person who consulted" the social worker in his or her professional ca-
30 Allen, 398 Mass. at 376-77, 496 N.E.2d at 1371. 
31 Id. at 377, 496 N.E.2d at 1371 (citing Collett, 387 Mass. at 428, 439 N.E.2d at 1226. 
In Collett, the Court stated: 
/d. 
Disclosures of confidential information can harm more than the individual social 
worker-client relationship involved. If it becomes known that confidences are vio-
lated, other people may be reluctant to use social work services, and may be unable 
to use them to maximum benefit. The purpose of enacting a social worker-client 
privilege is to prevent the chilling effect which routine disclosures may have in 
preventing those in need of help from seeking that help. 
32 G.L. c. ll2, § 135. For the text of chapter ll2, section 135, see supra note 1. 
33 Allen, 398 Mass. at 377, 496 N.E.2d at 1371. 
34 Collett, 387 Mass. at 430, 439 N.E.2d at 1227. In Collett, the defendant was charged 
with the second degree murder of his girlfriend's seven month old child. 387 Mass. at 425-
26, 439 N.E.2d at 1224-25. Prior to his indictment, a social worker had interviewed the 
defendant in the course of the social worker's treatment of the victim's family. /d. at 426, 
439 N.E.2d at 1225. When questioned as to her interviews with the defendant and the 
victim's family, the social worker claimed a privilege based on G.L. c. ll2, § 135. /d. The 
Commonwealth asserted that the privilege only applied where the informant was the social 
worker's client, and therefore, because the defendant and others whom the social worker 
interviewed were not technically her clients, communications from them were not privi-
leged. /d. at 428-29, 439 N.E.2d at 1226-27. 
The Court rejected the Commonwealth's proposed narrow reading of§ 135 by examining 
the legislative history of the statute. Because the legislature had previously considered, but 
not enacted, an earlier version of the statute which would have restricted the privilege to 
communications acquired from a client, the Court concluded that the legislature intended 
the privilege to protect communications from people other than those who were technically 
the social worker's client. /d. at 430, 439 N.E.2d at 1227 (citing 1972 House Doc. No. 1997; 
1971 House Doc. No. 4877). Therefore, the Court held that the privilege protects com-
munications acquired from a person consulting a social worker in his or her professional 
capacity. /d. 
35 See id. at 429, 439 N.E.2d at 1227. 
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pacity.36 Consequently, the Collett Court allowed the boyfriend of the 
mother of a child whose death a social worker was investigating to claim 
the privilege without a specific showing that the boyfriend had consulted 
with the social worker by seeking her advice or assistance. 37 
Because the legislature reenacted section 135 subsequent to Collett 
with more expansive language,38 the Allen Court interpreted this reen-
actment as an endorsement of the Collett Court's broad interpretation of 
section 135.39 The Allen Court therefore relied on Collett, and without 
requiring a showing that the informants "consulted" with the social 
worker by seeking the social worker's advice or assistance, concluded 
that communications from the decedent's grandparents and foster parents 
were privileged under section 135, unless an exception to the privilege 
applied.40 
The Court determined, however, that the social worker's personal 
observations while in the plaintiff's home would not be privileged.41 The 
Court reasoned that section 135 limits the privilege to communications 
"from a person."42 Because the social worker's personal observations did 
not meet this criterion, the Court held they were not privileged.43 
The Court then addressed the defendants' contention that by bringing 
her wrongful death action, the plaintiff had waived the social worker 
privilege with respect to the facts at issue in the action.44 The Court 
reasoned that the privilege belongs to the person who makes the disclo-
36 ld. 
37 ld. at 430,439 N.E.2d at 1227; cf. id. at 442,439 N.E.2d at 1233 (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
38 Chapter 524 of the Acts of 1985 amended § 135 to read: "No social worker ... shall 
disclose any information he may have acquired from a person consulting him in his profes-
sional capacity or whom he has served in his professional capacity ... "(italics added to 
indicate amendment). 
39 Allen, 398 Mass. at 377, 496 N.E.2d at 1372. 
40 Id. at 378,496 N.E.2d at 1372; cf. id. at 387,4% N.E.2d at 1377 (Liacos, J., dissenting). 
The Court did not address the issue of whether, based on the record, an exception to the 
social worker privilege applied, especially exception (b) which removes the privilege for 
communications revealing harmful acts, because the reported questions did not raise the 
issue and the judge indicated that the exceptions were immaterial to the case. Id. at 378 
n.5, 496 N.E.2d at 1372 n.5. 
41 Id. at 378, 4% N.E.2d at 1372. 
42 ld. (quoting G.L. c. 112, § 135). The Court was interpreting communications to mean 
only verbal communications. See id. 
43 Id. The Court did, however, indicate that FIPA may bar the defendants' access to 
records containing the social worker's personal observations. ld. at 381-82, 4% N.E.2d at 
1374. The Court held that disclosure would be improper if it would cause an unwarranted 
invasion of the plaintiff's privacy. I d. at 382, 4% N .E.2d at 1374. The Court noted, however, 
that because the social worker would not be prevented from testifying about her recorded 
observations by FIPA, disclosure of her recorded observations may not be an unwarranted 
invasion of the plaintiff's privacy. ld. at 381-82, 496 N.E.2d at 1374. 
44 Id. at 378, 496 N.E.2d at 1372. 
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sure, and therefore only that person has the power to waive the privi-
lege.45 Consequently, the Court held, the plaintiff's initiation of a lawsuit 
did not waive the privilege protecting communications acquired from the 
decedent's grandparents and foster parents.46 
Justice Liacos, in a dissenting opinion, disagreed with the majority's 
broad interpretation of the social worker privilegeY Justice Liacos as-
serted that the statutory obligation to maintain confidentiality is not 
necessarily the equivalent of a testimonial privilege.48 According to Jus-
tice Liacos, the Collett opinion, upon which the majority in part based 
its reasoning, failed to distinguish between an obligation not to disclose 
and a testimonial privilege.49 Limiting section 135 to an obligation not to 
disclose, Justice Liacos reasoned, would largely fulfill the legislative 
purpose of the statute, which is to prevent routine access to information 
a social worker may obtain.5° Furthermore, because certain exceptions 
to the statute allow for disclosure without utilizing the concept of a 
testimonial privilege,51 Justice Liacos argued that the statute was not 
concerned solely with a testimonial privilege. 52 In particular, Justice Lia-
cos noted that exception (b), which permits the disclosure of a "com-
munication that reveals the contemplation or commission of a crime or 
harmful act" is not concerned with merely disclosure at triai.53 Justice 
Liacos therefore concluded that the majority had misconstrued legislative 
intent by assuming that the statute uniformly created a testimonial priv-
ilege. 54 
According to Justice Liacos, a correct interpretation of the statute 
would restrict the privilege to confidential communications generated 
during a social worker-client relationship. 55 Justice Liacos reasoned that 
the statute would oblige a social worker not to disclose information 
acquired from any source, but that information from sources other than 
45 Id. 
46 Id. The Court did not address whether the plaintiff's bringing a suit would waive the 
privilege concerning any information a social worker may have acquired from her. See id. 
47 Id. at 387, 469 N.E.2d at 1377 (Liacos, J., dissenting). 
48 Id. at 384, 469 N.E.2d at 1375 (Liacos, J., dissenting). 
49 /d. at 384 & n.2, 469 N.E.2d at 1375 & n.2 (citing Collett, 387 Mass. at 426-27, 439 
N.E.2d at 1225-26). 
50 Id. at 384-85, 4% N.E.2d at 1376 (Liacos, J., dissenting). 
51 Id. at 385 & n.3, 496 N.E.2d at 1376 & n.3 (Liacos, J., dissenting) (citing G.L. c. ll2, 
§ l35(a),(b),(d),(f)). 
» Id. at 385, 496 N.E.2d at 1376 (Liacos, J., dissenting). 
53 Id. at 385 n.3, 4% N.E.2d at 1376 n.3 (Liacos, J., dissenting) (quoting G.L. ll2, 
§ l35(b)). 
54 Id. at 387, 4% N.E.2d at 1377 (Liacos, J., dissenting). 
55 Id. at 385,496 N.E.2d at 1376 (Liacos, J., dissenting) (citing Collett, 387 Mass. at 440-
42, 439 N.E.2d at 1232-33 (Lynch, J., dissenting)). 
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a client would not be privileged at trial. 56 Therefore, in contrast to the 
majority, Justice Liacos argued that section 135 obliged a social worker 
to maintain the confidentiality of personal observations. 57 Because the 
social worker's personal observations were not confidential communi-
cations revealed in the course of a social worker-client relationship, 
however, Justice Liacos stated that they were not covered by a testi-
monial privilege.58 Therefore, Justice Liacos agreed with the majority's 
conclusion that the social worker's personal observations within the 
plaintiff's home were subject to disclosure at trial. ~9 
To limit the testimonial privilege to communications arising from only 
the social worker-client relationship, Justice Liacos advocated a narrower 
interpretation of the statutory requirement that the information be ob-
tained from a "person consulting" the social worker. 60 According to 
Justice Liacos, in order to "consult" a social worker for the purposes of 
establishing a privilege, a person must seek the social worker's advice 
and assistance. 61 Under the majority's definition of "consult," Justice 
Liacos stated, a person "consults" with a social worker merely by giving 
the social worker information.62 Justice Liacos stated that this interpre-
tation of "consult" is too broad, and would result in a blanket privilege 
for all communications to a social worker based merely on his or her 
status as a social worker. 63 
Therefore, Justice Liacos argued that there must be evidence that an 
informant sought the social worker's advice or assistance before a testi-
56 /d. at 385, 496 N.E.2d at 1376 (Liacos, J., dissenting). 
57 I d. (Liacos, J., dissenting). 
ss /d. (Liacos, J., dissenting). 
59 /d. (Liacos, J., dissenting). Justice Liacos did not address whether FIPA would prevent 
the disclosure of the social worker's recorded personal observations./d. at 382,496 N.E.2d 
at 1374 (Liacos, J., dissenting). 
60 /d. at 385-86, 496 N.E.2d at 1376 (Liacos, J., dissenting). 
61 /d. at 386, 496 N.E.2d at 1376 (Liacos, J., dissenting) (citing Collett, 387 Mass. at 440, 
439 N.E.2d at 1232 (Lynch, J., dissenting)). In a dissenting opinion in Collett, Justice Lynch 
advocated a more exacting definition of "consult": 
To "consult" a social worker or other professional means, in the common under-
standing of the term, to seek that professional's advice or opinion. It is the confi-
dences of persons seeking such advice that the statute in question was intended to 
protect. There is nothing in the record on which to base the conclusion that the 
defendant consulted with the social worker, in the sense of seeking her advice or 
opinion, at any time. · 
Collett, 387 Mass. at 440, 439 N.E.2d at 1232 (emphasis in the original) (citations omitted). 
62 Allen, 398 Mass. at 386, 496 N.E.2d at 1376 (Liacos, J., dissenting). 
63 /d. (Liacos, J., dissenting). Justice Liacos rejected the majority's interpretation of the 
1985 amendment to § 135, see supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text, and argued the 
amendrfient required that a "professional relationship" exist between the social worker and 
informant in order for the privilege to exist. Allen, 398 Mass. at 387 n.5, 496 N.E.2d at 
1377 n.5 (Liacos J., dissenting). 
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monial privilege can protect communications ansmg from the social 
worker-informant relationship.64 Justice Liacos stated that the majority's 
expansive construction of Collett incorrectly suggested that the privilege 
extends to police officers, teachers, neighbors, and all others from whom 
a social worker acquires information in his or her professional capacity. 65 
Because on the record there was no finding that the decedent's grand-
parents or foster parents sought the advice or assistance of the social 
worker, Justice Liacos stated that communications from them were not 
privileged. 66 
In contrast to Justice Liacos, Justice Abrams, in her dissenting opinion, 
did not urge a more restrictive scope for the privilege, but rather sug-
gested that the Court should have allowed disclosure ofthe Department's 
report under an exception to the privilegeY Although the Court was not 
specifically confronted with exceptions to the privilege, Justice Abrams 
reasoned that the reported questions concerned chapter 112, section 135 
in general, and thereby also concerned each of the specifically enumer-
ated exceptions to the statute.68 Justice Abrams was concerned that 
clarifying the scope of the social worker privilege without addressing the 
scope of the exceptions to that privilege would provide insufficient in-
struction to the trial judge.69 Therefore, Justice Abrams concluded, the 
application of exceptions to the social worker privilege was properly 
before the Court, and should have been addressed. 70 
Justice Abrams argued in particular that exception (b) of section 135,71 
which exempts from the privilege a communication which "reveals the 
contemplation or commission of ... a hannful act,"72 required that the 
social worker's report be disclosed.73 According to Justice Abrams, pa-
rental neglect, as well as physical abuse, may constitute a harmful act 
64 ld. at 387, 469 N.E.2d at 1377 (Liacos, J., dissenting). 
65 ld. 
66 Id. 
67 Jd. at 391, 496 N.E.2d at 1379 (Abrams, J., dissenting). 
68 ld. at 388 & n.l, 496 N.E.2d at 1377 & n.1 (Abrams, J., dissenting). 
69 See id. at 388, 496 N.E.2d at 1377 (Abrams, J., dissenting). 
70 Id. at 387-88, N.E.2d at 1377-78 (Abrams, J., dissenting). 
71 Justice Abrams also suggested that exception (f) which allows for disclosure of infor-
mation a social worker acquires while conducting a chapter 119, section 51B investigation 
may apply. ld. at 387-88, 496 N.E.2d at 1377-78. The Department conducts an investigation 
pursuant to G.L. c. 112, § 51B after receiving a report of child abuse which G.L. c. 112, 
§ 51A requires certain professionals to file. Justice Abrams did not address whether excep-
tion (f) applied, however, because she assumed that the language of O.L. c. 112, § 135(f) 
was clear enough so that if G.L. c. 112, § 51B reports existed, the trial judge would have 
ordered their disclosure. Id. at 389 n.2, 496 N.E.2d at 1378 n.2. 
n G.L. c. 112, § 135(b). 
73 Jd. at 391, 496 N.E.2d at 1378-79. 
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for the purposes of exception (b).74 Examining the statutory scheme 
concerning the welfare of children, Justice Abrams noted that a profes-
sional who suspects a child is suffering from neglect must file a report 
with the Department, 75 which then initiates a Department investigation. 76 
Similarly, Justice Abrams noted that by statute a juvenile court's finding 
of neglect is sufficient to transfer custody of the child to the Department. 77 
Because the statutory provisions indicated that the legislature considered 
parental neglect to be injurious to children, Justice Abrams concluded 
that neglect constituted a harmful act for the purposes of exception (b).78 
Therefore, Justice Abrams stated that under chapter 112, section 135(b), 
communications which relate directly79 to either the abuse or neglect of 
a child are subject to disclosure notwithstanding the social worker priv-
ilege. 80 
74 Id. at 389-90, 496 N.E.2d at 1378-79. 
15 Id. at 388, 390, 496 N.E.2d at 1378-79 (citing G.L. c. 119, § 51A). Chapter 119, section 
51A requires that: 
Any physician, medical intern, hospital personnel engaged in the examination, care 
or treatment of persons, medical examiner, psychologist, emergency medical tech-
nician, dentist, nurse, chiropractor, podiatrist, osteopath, public or private school 
teacher, educational administrator, guidance or family counselor, day care worker, 
probation officer, clerk/magistrate of the district courts, social worker, foster parent, 
firefighter, or policeman, who, in his professional capacity shall have reasonable 
cause to believe that a child ... is suffering from serious physical or emotional 
injury resulting from abuse . ·. . or from neglect, . . . shall immediately report such 
condition to the department. 
ld. Professionals who fail to make these required reports are subject to fines. Id. 
76 Allen, 398 Mass. at 390, 4% N.E.2d at 1378-79 (Abrams, J., dissenting). Chapter 119, 
518 requires the Department to investigate section 51A reports. Information the Department 
compiles in a section 518 investigation is subject to disclosure under G.L. c. 112, § 135(f). 
nAllen, 398 Mass. at 390, 496 N.E.2d at 1379 (Abrams, J., dissenting) (citing G.L. c. 
119, § 24). Chapter 112, section 135(d) and (e) permit the disclosure of information compiled 
for child custody cases. 
78 See id. at 390-91, 496 N.E.2d at 1378-79 (Abrams, J., dissenting). 
79 In Collett, the Court narrowly construed G.L. c. 112, § 135(b) to require only disclosure 
of communications which relate directly to a crime or harmful act. 387 Mass. at 435, 439 
N.E.2d at 1230. Thus, the Court held, communications which did not implicate the defen-
dant directly in criminal activity, but merely indicated his consciousness of guilt were 
privileged. Id. 
80 Allen, 398 Mass. at 391, 4% N.E.2d at 1379 (Abrams, J., dissenting). Interpreting 
"harmful acts" to include physical abuse as well as neglect, Justice Abrams concluded that 
the trial judge had misconstrued exception (b) in light of his findings with regard to the 
contents of the social worker's report. Id. at 389, 496 N.E.2d at 1378 (Abrams, J., dis-
senting). Justice Abrams noted that the trial judge found that the report might support the 
defendants' claim of contributory negligence, and cast light on the cause of the decedent's 
illness. ld. (Abrams, J., dissenting). Thus, Justice Abrams concluded that the report con-
tained communications which related directly to the commission of harmful acts and 
consequently was exempt from the social worker privilege under exception (b). Id. at 391, 
4% N.E.2d at 1379 (Abrams, J., dissenting). 
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The Allen Court interpreted recent amendments to chapter 112, section 
135 to be a legislative endorsement of a broad application of the social 
worker privilege. In Allen, therefore, the Court reaffirmed its holding in 
Collett that the social worker privilege broadly applies to communications 
a social worker acquires during consultations with a specific client or 
with a third party.81 The Allen Court did not clarify how a person must 
"consult" with a social worker for the purposes of establishing a privi-
lege. 82 The Court suggested, however, that it would adhere to its position 
in Collett, 83 where it held that those people who would be likely to consult 
with a social worker during an investigation could claim the privilege. 84 
As it did in Collett, the Court in Allen did not require that a person 
actually seek the social worker's advice or assistance in order to establish 
the privilege. 85 Thus, a reasonable interpretation of Allen, as well as 
Collett, is that communications from all people who would be likely to 
consult with a social worker in his or her professional capacity are 
privileged under chapter 112, section 135.86 
Under Allen, the social worker privilege has a broader scope in Mas-
sachusetts than in other jurisdictions which recognize the privilege.87 
Nonetheless, the Allen Court's expansive interpretation of the social 
worker privilege is reasonable. First, the language of chapter 112, section 
135, which extends the privilege to information from "a person consulting 
[the social worker] in his professional capacity or whom [the social 
worker] has served in his professional capacity," is expansive.88 Other 
state legislatures drafting a social worker privilege have been more re-
strictive, and have limited the privilege to communications arising from 
81 /d. at 377-78, 4% N.E.2d at 1371-72 (citing Collett, 387 Mass. at 428-30, 439 N.E.2d 
at 1226-27). 
82 See id. at 378, 496 N.E.2d at 1372; cf id. at 386, 496 N.E.2d at 1376 (Liacos, J., 
dissenting). 
83 /d. at 378, 496 N.E.2d at 1372. 
84 Collett, 387 Mass. at 429, 439 N.E.2d at 1227. 
85 See Allen, 398 Mass. at 378, 4% N.E.2d at 1372; cf id. at 386-87,4% N.E.2d at 1376-
77 (Liacos, J., dissenting); see also Collett, 387 Mass. at 429-30, 439 N.E.2d at 1227; cf 
id. at 442, 439 N.E.2d at 1233 (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
86 Allen, 398 Mass. at 386, 496 N.E.2d at 1376 (Liacos, J., dissenting); Collett, 387 Mass. 
at 441, 439 N.E.2d at 1233 (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
87 For a discussion of cases construing the social worker statutes of other jurisdictions, 
see supra note 10. .. 
88 G.L. c. 112, § 135. Other statutory privileges in Massachusetts are more restrictive. 
For example, the priest-penitant privilege only precludes disclosure of a "confession made 
to [the priest] in his professional character, in the course of discipline enjoined by the rules 
or practice of the religious body to which he belongs." G.L. c. 233, § 20A. Similarly, the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege protects from disclosure only communications between 
the psychotherapist and patient "relative to the diagnosis or treatment of the patient's 
mental or emotional condition." G.L. c. 233, § 20B. 
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a social worker-client relationship,89 or within a therapeutic setting.90 A 
broad interpretation of the privilege, therefore, is consistent with the 
language of chapter 112, section 135. 
Second, by extending the privilege to people other than the social 
worker's specific client, the Allen Court maximizes a social worker's 
ability to obtain candid information and perform his or her duties. A 
social worker, unlike an attorney or doctor,91 rarely has a single client.92 
Particularly in cases of child abuse and neglect, a social worker's duties 
require communicating with a wide network of people.93 Because the 
assurance of confidentiality will encourage people to provide social work-
ers with information, a broad privilege allows social workers to utilize 
this informational network and provide quality services.94 Thus, the need 
for social workers to obtain sensitive information from a number of 
sources, and the expansive language of chapter 112, section 135 support 
a broad application of the social worker privilege. 
Restricting the privilege, as Justice Liacos suggested, to communica-
tions during only those "consultations" in which a person actually seeks 
the social worker's advice or assistance is problematic. Regardless of the 
meaning of "consult," the language of the current section 135 specifies 
that the privilege is not limited only to people who consult a social 
worker.95 Communications from any person whom the social worker 
serves in his or her professional capacity are also privileged.96 Thus, the 
language of section 135, as amended,97 undercuts Justice Liacos' restric-
tive interpretation of the social worker privilege. 
The Allen Court left open the issue of which activities constitute "harm-
89 E.g., MICH. STAT. ANN.§ 18.425(1610) (Callaghan 1986); N.Y. Ctv. PRAc. LAW§ 4508 
(McKinney Supp. 1987). 
90 E.g., CAL. Evm. CooE §§ 1010-1012 (West Supp. 1987); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§ 335.170 (Michie 1986). 
91 Massachusetts courts have recognized common law privileges for attorney-client and 
physician-patient relationships. See e.g., Alberts v. Devine, 395 Mass. 59,479 N.E.2d 113 
(1985) (physician-patient); Drew v. Drew, 250 Mass. 41, 144 N.E. 763 (1924) (attorney-
client). The Court has construed these privileges narrowly. In Alberts, the Court held that 
the privilege precludes disclosure of information a physician acquires during the course of 
a professional relationship with his or her client. See Alberts, 395 Mass. at 69, 479 N.E.2d 
at 120. In Drew, the Court held that if some party other than the attorney's clieQt was 
present, the privilege will not appiy. Drew, 250 Mass. at 44-45, 144 N.E.2d at 764. 
92 Note, The Social Worker-Client Privilege - Commonwealth v. Collett, 6 W. NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 1103, 1122 (1984). 
93 /d. 
94 See id. 
95 For the text of G.L. c. 112, § 135, see supra note 1. 
96 /d. 
97 For the text of the relevant amendment, see supra note 38. 
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ful acts" for the purposes of exception (b). 98 The Court has recognized 
that the exceptions to the privilege indicate that the legislature considered 
other societal interests to be more important than the social worker 
privilege in certain circumstances.99 Justice Abrams, in her dissent in 
Allen, forcefully argued that there is a strong societal interest in the 
welfare of children. 100 This interest, she maintained, would be furthered 
by interpreting "harmful acts" in exception (b) to include not only child 
abuse but also neglect. 101 , If the Court subsequently adopts Justice 
Abrams' interpretation of the "harmful acts" exception, the social worker 
privilege will be unavailable in cases of child abuse and neglect, and the 
resulting disclosure will further the legislative goal of protecting children. 
In sum, the Allen Court reaffirmed its previous holding in Collett that 
the social worker privilege applies to communications a social worker 
obtains from consulting with either a specific client or a third party. 
Although the Court did not clarify how a person "consults" with a social 
worker for the purpose of establishing a privilege, the Court indicated 
that it will not closely investigate a specific social worker-informant 
relationship to determine whether the two consulted; instead, the Court 
suggested that those persons who are likely to consult with a social 
worker during an investigation may claim the privilege. Thus, under 
Allen, the social worker privilege potentially may protect all communi-
cations a ·social worker acquires during an investigation. 
§ 5.4. Impeaching a Defense Witness' Credibility for Failure to Provide 
Exculpatory Information to Law Enforcement Officials.* Massachusetts 
prosecutors, may, under certain circumstances, impeach a defense wit-
ness' testimony by establishing that, in certain situations, the witness 
failed to provide exculpatory information to law enforcement officials 
prior to testifying at trial. 1 A witness' prior silence in situations where 
one would naturally step forward to exonerate an accused implies that 
the witness did not possess the information earlier, and that the testimony 
is a recent fabrication. 2 Accordingly, evidence 'Of prior silence is relevant 
98 Allen, 398 Mass. at 378 n.5, 496 N.E.2d at 1372 n.5, cf. id. at 391, 496 N.E.2d at 1379 
(Abrams, J., dissenting). 
99 Collett, 387 Mass. at 428, 439 N.E.2d at 1226. 
100 See Allen, 398 Mass. at 390-91, 496 N.E.2d at 1379 (Abrams, J., dissenting). 
101 Id. (Abrams, J., dissenting). 
* Valerie L. Passman, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS -LAW. 
§ 5.4. 1 Commonwealth v. Berth, 385 Mass. 784, 790, 434 N.E.2d 192, 196 (1982); 
Commonwealth v. Brown, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 288, 295-97, 416 N.E.2d 218, 224-25 (1981}; 
P. LIACOS, HANDBOOK OF MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE 52 (Supp. 1985) [hereinafter HAND-
BOOK]. 
2 HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 52. Massachusetts has not codified rules of evidence, 
although model rules were proposed at one time. All Massachusetts rules of evidence, 
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when the witness had no legitimate reason for remaining silent. 3 To 
preclude prosecutors from inappropriately offering evidence that the wit-
ness did not provide information to the police, some jurisdictions require 
the prosecution to first lay a foundation showing that circumstances were 
such that the witness would have naturally come forward. 4 In 1981, the 
Massachusetts Appeals Court explicitly detailed the elements of such a 
foundation in Commonwealth v. Brown.s The Brown court held that, 
before cross-examining a witness, a Massachusetts prosecutor must show 
that the witness understood the pending charges in sufficient detail before 
trial to realize that the information was exculpatory, had reason to pro-
vide the information, was familiar with the means of reporting the infor-
mation, and must not have been asked by the defendant or defense 
attorney to refrain from providing the information. 6 The following year, 
the Supreme Judicial Court adopted the Brown foundation in Common-
wealth v. Berth.7 
During the Survey year, in Commonwealth v. Rivers,8 the Appeals 
Court reversed a defendant's conviction because the prosecutor cross-
examined defense witnesses regarding their failure to provide information 
to police even though the foundation did not establish that the witnesses 
understood the charges in sufficient detail to know they possessed ex-
culpatory information, as required by Brown.9 The court went on, how-
ever, to reason that the cross-examination was also improper because 
the witnesses reasonably may have believed themselves vulnerable to 
prosecution, and thus, would not naturally come forward. 10 In so holding, 
the Rivers court correctly followed both the policy and explicit require-
ments of Brown. The court's reasoning, however, created confusion 
about the proper approach for preventing cross-examination regarding a 
witness' prior silence where the witness may have feared prosecution. It 
is unclear whether prosecutors must now establish, as a fifth foundational 
element, that the witness had no fear of prosecution, or whether trial 
therefore, are developed by common Jaw. See HANDBOOK, supra note 1, for a compilation 
of the Massachusetts law of evidence. 
3 HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 53. 
4 See, e.g., People v. McMath, 104 Ill. App. 2d 302, 244 N.E.2d 330 (1968), aff'd 45 Ill. 
2d 33, 256 N.E.2d 835 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 846 (1970); People v. Dawson, 50 
N.Y.2d 3ll, 406 N.E.2d 771, 428 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1980). 
5 ll Mass. App. Ct. at 295-97, 416 N.E.2d at 224. 
6 Brown, ll Mass. App. Ct. at 295-97, 416 N.E.2d at 224. The Brown court adopted the 
specific foundation recommended in Dawson, 50 N.Y.2d at 321-22 n.4, 406 N.E.2d at 777 
n.4, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 921 n.4. See Brown, ll Mass. App. Ct. at 296, 416 N.E.2d at 224. 
7 385 Mass. 784, 790, 434 N.E.2d 192, 196 (1982). 
8 21 Mass. App. Ct. 645, 489 N.E.2d 206 (1986). 
9 Id. at 648, 489 N.E.2d at 208. 
10 /d. 
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judges must simply consider, when exercising discretion to allow the 
cross-examination, the possibility that the witness' silence was fear-
related. 
In Rivers, the Appeals Court reviewed the jury trial conviction of 
Richard Rivers for possessing and intending to distribute a controlled 
substance. 11 At trial, the prosecution and the defense presented two 
different versions of the events leading to Rivers' arrestY The prosecu-
tion's case consisted of the testimony of Michael Bean, who claimed that 
Rivers handed him a bag of pills, later identified by laboratory exami-
nation as lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD). 13 Bean stated that when he 
approached Rivers' parked car, Rivers and his girlfriend, Sharon Holmes, 
were seated inside the car and two men, Michael Donnelly and Andrew 
Morrow, were standing outside. 14 As he passed by, Bean testified, Rivers 
called out to him, asking if Bean wanted to purchase some LSD. 15 Bean 
stated that he responded affirmatively, and got into Rivers' car. 16 Bean 
further claimed that Rivers handed Bean the bag of pills, and at that 
moment, a policeman shined a flashlight into the car. 17 Bean stated that 
he then threw the bag out the driver's side window and fled on foot. 18 A 
police officer testified that, upon being called in for questioning the 
following day, Bean related the events testified to at trial. 19 
The defense offered a different version of the story, which attempted 
to show that Bean offered to sell the LSD. 20 Both Donnelly, who was 
standing outside the car, and Rivers' girlfriend Holmes, who was seated 
inside the car, testified that Bean was selling the drugs. 21 Holmes also 
testified that, once inside the car, it was Bean, not the defendant Rivers, 
who produced the pills. 22 
Before allowing the prosecutor to ask Donnelly and Holmes whether 
11 Jd. at 645, 489 N.E.2d at 207. 
12 Jd. at 646, 489 N.E.2d at 207. 
13 Id. at 646 & n.l, 489 N.E.2d at 207 & n.l. 
14 Jd. at 646, 489 N.E.2d at 207. 
IS Jd. 
16 ld. 
17 Id. 
18 Jd. 
19 ld. 
20 ld. 
21 ld. 
22 Jd. at 646-47, 489 N.E.2d at 208. The parties did not dispute the events that took place 
following Bean's departure. See generally id. at 646-47, 489 N.E.2d at 207-08. The police 
officer found the pills on the ground, and asked the three men if the pills belonged to them. 
Jd. at 646, 489 N.E.2d at 207. When they responded negatively, the officer arrested Rivers. 
Id. The officer also took Donnelly to the police station, where he spent several hours in 
protective custody. Jd. at 647, 489 N.E.2d at 208. While in custody, Donnelly supplied 
Bean's name to the police. ld. 
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they told police that Bean, rather than Rivers, produced the pills, the 
trial judge required the prosecutor to lay the Brown-mandated founda-
tion. 23 Preliminary questioning revealed that Holmes and Donnelly knew 
Rivers was arrested for possession of LSD, but neither witness under-
stood that Rivers was also being charged with intent to distribute the 
drug. 24 After the prosecutor completed this line of questioning, the trial 
judge allowed him to ask both Donnelly and Holmes whether they had 
gone to the police prior to triaJ.25 Both responded negatively. 26 
The superior court jury convicted Rivers, who then appealedY The 
only issue before the Appeals Court was whether the trial judge erred in 
allowing cross-examination about Donnelly's and Holmes' failure to go 
to the police.28 Reviewing the rationale in Brown, the court first noted 
that, although citizens have n<J duty to offer exculpatory information to 
police, there are many situations in which a person would naturally offer 
police information on behalf of a relative or friend. 29 Under such circum-
stances, the court stated, a witness' silence may be probative as a prior 
inconsistent statement.30 Nevertheless, because there may be other rea-
sons for a witness' silence, the court cautioned, Massachusetts law re-
quires a prosecutor to lay a foundation before impeaching a witness' 
testimony in this mannerY Once the prosecutor lays the foundation, the 
court stated, the trial judge possesses wide discretion in determining 
whether the information reaches the jury.32 
After summarizing the Massachusetts position, the court addressed the 
adequacy of the prosecutor's foundation in Rivers. 33 The court ruled that 
23 /d. at 647, 489 N.E.2d at 208. 
24 /d. 
25 /d. 
26 /d. The prosecutor further questioned the witnesses about why they did not provide 
the exculpatory information to the police. /d. The opinion does not detail the witnesses' 
reasons. 
27 /d. at 645, 489 N.E.2d at 206. 
28 /d. at 645, 489 N.E.2d at 207. 
29 /d. at 647, 489 N.E.2d at 208 (quoting Brown, 11 Mass. App. Ct. at 295, 416 N.E.2d 
at 224). 
30 /d. (quoting Brown, 11 Mass. App. Ct. at 296, 416 N.E.2d at 224). 
31 Id. The required foundation includes: 
[E]stablishing that the witness knew of the pending charges in sufficient detail to 
realize that he possessed exculpatory information, that the witness had reason to 
make the information available, that he was familiar with the means of reporting it 
to the proper authorities, and that the defendant or his lawyer, or both, did not ask 
the witness to refrain from doing so. 
/d. at 647-48, 489 N .E.2d at 208 (quoting Brown, 11 Mass. App. Ct. at 296-97, 416 N.E.2d 
at 224). 
32 /d. at 648, 489 N.E.2d at 208 (quoting Brown, 11 Mass. App. Ct. at 297, 416 N.E.2d 
at 224-25). 
33 /d. 
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the prosecutor failed to establish in the foundation that either Donnelly 
or Holmes understood that Rivers was charged with intent to distribute 
LSD as well as with possession of LSD. 34 The court explained that the 
witnesses could not have understood the importance of information about 
who produced the pills without knowing of the charge for intent to 
distribute. 35 
The court continued by offering a second reason why the cross-ex-
amination in Rivers was improper. 36 It was likely, the court suggested, 
that the witnesses felt that they, too, were vulnerable to prosecution for 
events surrounding the police officer's discovery of the LSDY The court 
analogized the witnesses' silence to the pre-arrest silence of a defendant, 
which has extremely minimal probative value because people generally 
understand that they have the right to remain silent. 38 The court reasoned 
that it would be reasonable for Donnelly and Holmes to assume that their 
participation in the unlawful drug transaction was culpable and that the 
content of their trial testimony, if revealed earlier, might be used against 
them. 39 Under such circumstances, the court stated, the witnesses would 
not be expected to come forward with information.40 The court concluded 
that, because the witnesses' credibility was critical, the trial judge erred 
in allowing the cross-examination. 41 
In holding that the foundation was insufficient because the witnesses 
may not have known they possessed exculpatory information, the Rivers 
court correctly applied the rule established in Brown. Brown explicitly 
requires prosecutors to demonstrate that a witness understood the 
charges in sufficient detail to realize he or she possessed exculpatory 
information.42 Without knowing that the charge related to distribution of 
the LSD, Donnelly and Holmes could not understand the relevance of 
information concerning who produced the drug. The Rivers court needed 
only to apply the Brown mandate to find the cross-examination improper. 
The Rivers court went beyond the Brown court's reasoning, however, 
in also finding the cross-examination inappropriate because the witnesses 
may have believed themselves vulnerable to prosecution and thus would 
not naturally have come forward. 43 This reasoning is consistent with the 
34 Id. 
3s Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 648, 489 N.E.2d at 208-09 (citing Commonwealth v. Nickerson, 386 Mass. 54, 
60-61, 434 N.E.2d 992, 996 (1982)). 
39 Id. at 649, 489 N.E.2d at 209. 
40 Id. at 648, 489 N.E.2d at 208. 
41 Id. at 649, 489 N.E.2d at 209. 
42 See 11 Mass. App. Ct. at 296, 416 N.E.2d at 224. 
43 Rivers, 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 648, 489 N.E.2d at 208. 
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policy·of Brown, permitting the cross-examination only where the witness 
would naturally have provided exculpatory information but did not.44 
Brown, however, does not explicitly require a showing that the witness 
did not fear prosecution.45 The Rivers court attributed its reasoning to 
Brown by linking the witnesses' fear of prosecution to the first founda-
tional element, understanding the charges.46 That link, however, is un-
clear. It is possible for a witness to possess complete understanding of 
the charges, yet remain fearful of self-incrimination. This is particularly 
true where the witness' fears are well-founded because he or she com-
mitted an illegal act. 
The facts in Rivers also illustrate a situation where the witnesses' 
knowledge of the charges was irrelevant to a concern over their own 
culpability. From the witnesses' perspective, it made little difference 
whether the charge was for trying to sell or for merely possessing LSD. 
Either way, the witnesses were on the scene during a drug transaction 
and were nearby when the police officer found LSD pills on the groundY 
It is unlikely that an enhanced understanding of the charges would have 
alleviated the witnesses' concern. Rather, they may have been even more 
fearful, believing themselves vulnerable to prosecution for more serious 
charges related to drug trafficking. Thus, although prohibiting the cross-
examination because witnesses who fear prosecution do not naturally 
volunteer information to police is consistent with Brown's policy, such 
reasoning goes beyond the Brown court's required foundational elements. 
As a result of the court's reasoning in Rivers, the procedural require-
ments for impeaching a witness' credibility with his or her prior silence 
remain unclear. Although the Rivers court explained that trial judges 
must consider a witness' vulnerability when determining whether to allow 
a cross-examination about prior silence,48 the court did not clarify how 
this should be done. There are two possibilities. The first is that prose-
cutors must now establish, as a fifth foundational element, that the wit-
ness had no reason to fear prosecution. The second is that trial judges 
must simply consider, when exercising discretion to allow the cross-
examination, the possibility that the witness' silence was fear-related. 
Because of this ambiguity, prosecutors should, if possible, show in the 
foundation that it was unlikely the witness remained silent for fear of his 
or her own criminal prosecution. 
In Rivers, the Appeals Court reversed a defendant's conviction because 
the prosecution impermissibly impeached the defense witnesses' credi-
44 See Brown, 11 Mass. App. Ct. at 295, 416 N.E.2d at 224. 
45 See id. at 296-97, 416 N.E.2d at 224. 
46 Rivers, 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 648, 489 N.E.2d at 208. 
47 See id. at 646, 489 N.E.2d at 207. 
48 Id. at 648, 489 N.E.2d at 208. 
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bility by bringing out their failure to provide exculpatory information to 
the police. The court relied on Brown, holding that the prosecution failed 
to establish that the witnesses knew the charges in sufficient detail to 
realize that they possessed exculpatory information and that they may 
not have come forward because they feared prosecution for their own 
involvement. The Rivers court followed both the policy and explicit 
requirements of Brown, but failed to explain the procedural requirements 
for future cases. It remains unclear whether prosecutors must now es-
tablish during the foundation for impeachment that the witness had no 
reason to fear prosecution. Because Rivers does not adequately illustrate 
the procedural requirements for impeachment, a cautious practitioner's 
approach would include proving, if possible, that the witness' silence 
was unrelated to a concern regarding his or her own criminal involvement 
in the case. 
§ 5.5. Expanding the Scope of the Spontaneous Exclamation Exception 
to the Rule Against Hearsay.* For over one hundred years, Massachusetts 
courts refused to admit hearsay statements under the spontaneous excla-
mation exception to the rule against hearsay unless the statements were 
contemporaneous with an event causing excitement or shock. 1 In 1960, 
however, the Supreme Judicial Court, in Rocco v. Boston-Leader, Inc., 
abandoned the strict contemporaneous approach in favor of a more sub-
jective approach which allows statements made subsequent to an event 
causing excitement to be admitted. 2 The Rocco court, in defining the 
parameters of admissibility under the spontaneous exclamation exception 
incorporated the language of Professor Wigmore's popular treatise, not-
ing: 
The utterance must have been before there has been time to contrive and 
misrepresent . . . . It is to be observed that the statements need not be 
strictly contemporaneous with the exciting cause; they may be subsequent 
to it provided there has not been time for the exciting influence to lose its 
sway and to be dissipated .... [T]here can be no definite and fixed limit 
of time. Each case must depend upon its own circumstances.3 
While many Massachusetts courts have followed the Rocco doctrine,4 
during the Survey year, the Appeals Court, in Commonwealth v. Fuller, 
broadened the scope of the spontaneous exclamation exception by up-
holding a trial judge's decision to admit noncontemporaneous statements 
*David L. Ruediger, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETIS LAW. 
§ 3.6. 1 See LIACOS, HANDBOOK OF MASSACHUSETIS EVIDENCE, 350 (1981). 
2 340 Mass. 195, 196-97, 163 N.E.2d 157, 158 (1960). 
3 /d. at 197, 163 N.E.2d at 158 (citing 6 WIGMORE, EviDENCE§ 1750 (1976)). 
4 LIACOS, supra note 1, at 351 (citing Commonwealth v. Sellon, 380 Mass. 220, 402 
N.E.2d 1329 (1980); Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 364 Mass. 211, 303 N.E.2d 338 (1973); 
Commonwealth v. Hampton, 351 Mass. 447, 221 N.E.2d 766 (1966)). 
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made by one not clearly in an excited or troubled state.5 In Fuller, the 
trial judge allowed a three-year-old girl's mother to relate out-of-court 
statements made by the child to the mother concerning sexually abusive 
acts committed by the defendant.6 Although the child did not appear in 
court, the trial judge ruled that the statements of the child, as testified to 
by the mother, were admissible under the spontaneous exclamation ex-
ception to the rule against hearsay.7 
The mother testified that on the afternoon of October 12, 1984, she left 
the child at home in the care of the defendant, who was then seventeen 
years old and had previously babysat for the child.8 When she returned 
home two hours later, she heard "shuffling" noises in the upstairs bath-
room.9 She called out, and in response the child emerged from the bath-
room.10 The mother observed that the child's pants and underwear were 
down below her knees.U At the same time, the mother observed the 
defendant in the bathroom zipping up his trousersY In response to the 
mother's inquiry, the defendant explained that he had been using the 
bathroom when the child entered claiming that she also needed to use 
the bathroom. 13 
While the defendant remained upstairs, the mother took the child 
downstairs to examine the child for signs of touching. 14 The mother 
became extremely upset, and decided to drive one block to the office of 
a local doctor to see if he would be willing to examine the child. 15 Upon 
hearing the mother relate the events, the doctor agreed to see the child 
immediately. 16 The mother quickly returned home to pick up the child 
and bring her to the doctor's officeY 
During the short drive, the mother asked the child if the defendant had 
touched her. 18 When the child answered affirmatively, the mother asked 
the child where the defendant had touched her. 19 The child told the 
mother that the defendant had touched her vagina. 20 Upon further inquiry, 
'22 Mass. App. Ct. 152, 156, 491 N.E.2d 1083, 1086 (1986). 
6 /d. at 153, 491 N.E.2d at 1084. 
7 Id. 
8 /d. 
9 /d. 
10 /d. 
11 /d. 
12 /d. 
13 Id. 
14 /d. at 153-54, 491 N.E.2d at 1084. 
15 /d. at 154, 491 N.E.2d at 1084. 
16 /d. 
17 /d. 
18 /d. 
19 /d. 
20 /d. 
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the child said that she had placed her mouth on the defendant's penis. 21 
At trial, in addition to reciting the child's statements, the mother also 
testified that during the conversation in the car the child had not acted 
upset or troubled, but instead seemed more curious about what was 
happening. 22 After being arrested and questioned, the defendant signed 
a statement admitting to the incidents related by the child. 23 However, 
the defendant asserted that the acts did not occur in the manner testified 
to by the child's mother.24 
The significant issue addressed by the Appeals Court was whether the 
mother's testimony concerning the child's statements was properly ruled 
admissible under the spontaneous exclamation exception to the rule 
against hearsay. 25 Before concluding that the trial judge's ruling allowing 
the statements was within his range of discretion, 26 the Appeals Court 
reviewed the basic principles governing admissibility of statements under 
exceptions to the rule against hearsay. The court first noted that hearsay 
may be admitted only when the circumstances negate the probability that 
the statement in question was fabricated or contrivedY Next, the court 
explained that the spontaneous exclamation exception rests upon the 
general premise that a spectator who observes or is involved in an event 
that produces extreme excitement or shock, will often remain in a state 
of nervous excitement that eliminates the ability of the spectator to 
contrive or fabricate. 28 Thus, the court noted, under the spontaneous 
exclamation exception to the rule against hearsay, statements made by a 
spectator within a short period of time following an event causing great 
excitement may be considered reliable, and hence, admissible, if there is 
a showing that the event produced a state of nervous excitement sufficient 
to render the spectator uttering the statements incapable of fabricating 
or misrepresenting the incidents pertaining to the event. 29 
The Appeals Court cited three cases as support for the admissibility 
of noncontemporaneous statements under the spontaneous exclamation 
exception. 30 The first, Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, decided by the 
Supreme Judicial Court in 1973, held that statements made by a witness 
21 /d. 
22 /d. 
23 /d. at 154, 491 N.E.2d at 1084-85. 
24 See id. at 155, 491 N.E.2d at 1085. 
25 /d. at 153, 491 N.E.2d at 1084. 
26 Jd. at 156, 491 N.E.2d at 1086. 
27 /d. at 155, 491 N.E.2d at 1085. 
28 /d. 
29 /d. 
30 Jd. at 155, 491 N.E.2d at 1085 (citing McLaughlin, 364 Mass. at 223, 303 N.E.2d at 
347; Sellon, 380 Mass. at 229-30, 402 N.E.2d at 1337; Commonwealth v. Puleio, 394 Mass. 
101, 104-05, 474 N.E.2d 1078, 1081 (1985)). 
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to a fatal shooting uttered within minutes of the event were sufficiently 
spontaneous to be admissible under the Rocco's sufficiently reliable, 
noncontemporaneous doctrine. 31 Similarly in 1980, the Supreme Judicial 
Court, in Commonwealth v. Sellon, upheld a trial judge's decision to 
allow a third party to relate the statements of a manslaughter victim made 
several minutes after the event which ultimately resulted in the victim's 
death. 32 Again, in 1985, in Commonwealth v. Puleio, the Supreme Judicial 
Court affirmed a trial judge's decision to admit statements uttered by a 
spectator who observed a fatal shooting although the statements were 
made in response to a direct inquiry by a third party and they occurred 
a short time after the shooting. 33 
The Fuller court then cited Rocco as requiring that a trial judge be 
given broad discretion in determining the admissibility of statements 
under the spontaneous exclamation exception. 34 The court stated that a 
trial judge's decision should be reversed only when it is clearly erro-
neous.35 Analyzing the trial judge's decision in Fuller in light of this 
principle, the Appeals Court noted that the judge had offered several 
reasons for determining that the child's out-of-court statements were 
admissible under the spontaneous exclamation exception. 36 Included 
among these were the child's age,37 the fact that the child did not answer 
the questions with a simple yes or no or adopt facts suggested by the 
mother, 38 and the close proximity in time between the event and the 
statements.39 Although the mother's testimony indicated that the child 
was not clearly excited when she made the statements,40 the Appeals 
Court reasoned that excitement alone does not determine admissibility.41 
Instead, the court noted, according to Rocco, admissibility of statements 
must depend on whether the statements were uttered spontaneously 
within a short time after the event such that the ability to fabricate or 
misrepresent was eliminated. 42 Further, the Fuller court reasoned, when 
the statement is uttered by a young child not capable of fully appreciating 
the gravity of the event, it is more appropriate to determine admissibility 
on the basis of spontaneity rather than the extent of the excitement. 43 
31 364 Mass. at 223-24, 303 N.E.2d at 347. 
32 380 Mass. at 229, 402 N.E.2d at 1337. 
33 394 Mass. at 104-05, 474 N.E.2d at 1081. 
34 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 155, 491 N.E.2d at 1084. 
35 /d. 
36Jd. 
37 /d. 
38Jd. 
39Jd. 
40 /d. at 154, 491 N.E.2d at 1084. 
41 Id. at 156, 491 N.E.2d at 1085. 
42Jd. 
43 /d. at 156, 491 N.E.2d at 1086. 
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In concluding that the child's statements fell within the limits of the 
spontaneous exclamation exception although uttered in response to non-
contemporaneous direct inquiry,44 the court relied on two additional 
cases.45 First, the court cited Commonwealth v. Rivera, in which the 
Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the admissibility of statements made by 
a fifteen-year-old rape victim to her mother concerning the victim's ability 
to identify the defendant.46 Noting that the statements were made by the 
victim within thirty minutes after she had been subjected to an extremely 
traumatic event,47 the Court in Rivera concluded that the trial judge was 
justified in ruling that the statements were admissible because they were 
uttered before the victim had time to contrive or fabricate. 48 
Second, the Fuller court cited Commonwealth v. Burden in which an 
Appeals Court upheld a trial judge's decision to allow statements made 
by a dying rape victim to a third party in response to the third party's 
inquiry as to the identity of the victim's attackers.49 While the Burden 
court noted that questioning was a factor that could be considered by 
the trial judge,50 the mere fact that statements had been uttered in re-
sponse to inquiry did not render the statements unreliable.51 Hence, the 
Fuller court, relying on Burden and Rivera, concluded that it was within 
the trial judge's range of discretion to rule that the mother's inquiry did 
not diminish the spontaneity of the child's statements. 52 In light of the 
defendent's corroboration and the totality of the circumstances, the 
Fuller court concluded that the trial judge had sufficient basis to deter-
mine that the child's statements were "within the ambit of the sponta-
neous exclamation exception to the rule against hearsay. "53 
The Appeals Court's decision in Fuller is noteworthy in several re-
spects. First, the decision follows the Rocco line of cases which limits 
appellate review of trial judges' decisions concerning admissibility. The 
Fuller court stated that a trial judge must be given "broad discretion" in 
determining the admissibility of statements under the spontaneous excla-
mation exception to the rule against hearsay. 54 Further, the court noted 
that the decision of the trial judge should only be revised in "clear 
44Jd. 
45 /d. (citing Commonwealth v. Rivera, 397 Mass. 244, 248, 490 N.E.2d 1160, 1163 (1986); 
Commonwealth v. Burden, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 666, 676, 448 N.E.2d 387, 395 (1983)). 
46 397 Mass. at 248, 490 N.E.2d at 1163. 
47 /d. at 247, 490 N.E.2d at 1162. 
48 /d. at 248, 490 N.E.2d at 1163. 
49 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 676, 448 N.E.2d at 395. 
50 Id. at 676, 448 N.E.2d at 395. 
"/d. at 676-77, 448 N.E.2d at 395. 
52 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 156, 491 N.E.2d at 1086. 
53Jd. 
54 /d. at 155, 491 N.E.2d at 1085. 
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cases."55 For future courts focusing on the admissibility of hearsay evi-
dence, the Fuller court's straightforward language provides a clear mes-
sage: decisions of admissibility are subject to revision only when the 
decision of the trial judge is clearly erroneous. 
Second, Fuller adds support to the current trend away from strict 
contemporaneity. Fuller adopts the approach of Rocco which allows 
statements made subsequent to an event causing excitement to be ad-
mitted under the spontaneous exclamation exception. In Fuller, as in 
Rocco, Sellon and Puleio, the statements were uttered some time after 
the event. Although not contemporaneous, the court upheld the trial 
judge's conclusion that the statements were close enough in time to the 
event to be admissible under the exception. 56 For future cases, the Fuller 
court's holding makes clear that trial judges are free to follow a more 
flexible approach and admit statements made subsequent to an event 
under the spontaneous exclamation exception to the rule against hearsay. 
Lastly, an aspect of Fuller that does not follow precedent concerns the 
extent to which the individual making the statements must be in an 
excited state in order for the statements to be admissible under the 
spontaneous exclamation exception. Whereas prior cases stressed that 
the individual uttering the statements was in a state of hysteria or ner-
vousness, 57 the Fuller court noted that the child was too young to appre-
ciate the gravity of the situation and become excited within the usual 
meaning of the word. 58 To overcome the requirement that the individual 
be in an excited state, the court focused on the importance of spontaneity. 
Thus, by de-emphasizing excitement and stressing spontaneity, the court 
achieved the desired outcome. According to Fuller, the appropriate test 
is not whether the individual was excited, rather it depends on whether 
the statements, when considered under the totality of the circumstances 
were sufficiently spontaneous. 
Fuller, although properly decided when considered in light of other 
evidence, is likely to be limited to its facts on the issue of the importance 
of the individual's excited state. The requirement that the individual 
making the statements be in a state of hysteria or excitement so as to 
render him or her incapable of contriving or misrepresenting is the cor-
nerstone of the spontaneous exclamation exception.59 In Fuller, the court 
substituted the child's age for the requirement of an excited state. Al-
though the statements admitted in Fuller were noncontemporaneous and 
55 /d. 
56 /d. at 155-56, 491 N.E.2d at 1085-86. 
57 See, e.g., Rivera, 397 Mass. at 248, 490 N.E.2d at ll63; McLaughlin, 364 Mass. at 
215, 303 N.E.2d at 342. 
58 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 156, 491 N.E.2d at 1086. 
59 See generally, WIGMORE, EVIDENCE supra note 3, at§ 1750. 
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uttered in response to direct inquiry by one not clearly in an excited 
state, the court concluded that the child's young age rendered her incap-
able of contriving or misrepresenting.60 In addition, the court noted that 
the defendant's admission corroborated the child's statements, thereby 
rendering them reliable. 61 Thus, while the court's holding runs contrary 
to the traditional requirement that statements admitted under the spon-
taneous exclamation exception be uttered by one in a state of hysteria 
or excitement, under the specific Circumstances, it is understandable. 
Absent such circumstances, however, it is unlikely that the decision in 
Fuller will be followed by future courts. 
In conclusion, it is important to note that Fuller supports the current 
trend towards broadening the scope of the spontaneous exclamation 
exception. In Massachusetts, cases such as Fuller require that trial judges 
be given great discretion in determining admissibility of hearsay state-
ments. While Fuller indicates that courts are likely to continue to admit 
noncontemporaneous statements under the spontaneous exclamation ex-
ception, the Fuller court's de-emphasis of the requirement that the indi-
vidual making the statements be in an excited state is not likely to be 
followed. Thus, even after Fuller, for noncontemporaneous statements 
to be admissible under the spontaneous exclamation exception to the 
rule against hearsay, Massachusetts courts require that it be shown that 
the statements to be admitted were made by an individual in a state of 
nervous excitement such that the individual's ability to contrive or mis-
represent the details of the event is eliminated. 
60 See 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 156, 491 N.E.2d at 1086. 
61 /d. 
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